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Editor’s note:
Federal agencies 
and regulators have 
taken decisive steps 
to combat the 
financial crisis that 
began in the 
summer of 2007 
and continued into 
the fall of this year. 
This Economic 
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at the end of september 2008, U.s. policymakers had been working 
for more than a year to contain the shock waves from plunging home prices 
and the subsequent financial market turmoil. For the Federal reserve, the 
crisis has given new meaning to the adage that extraordinary times call for ex-
traordinary measures. the central bank has dusted off depression-era powers 
and rewritten old rules to address serious risks to the global financial system.
the spreading financial crisis has led the Fed to pump liquidity 
into the economy and expand its lending beyond the commercial banking 
sector. In March, it assisted with J.P. Morgan chase’s buyout of Bear stearns, a 
cash-strapped investment bank and brokerage. six months later, the Fed took 
direct action again, with an $85 billion bridge loan to prevent the disorderly  EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 2   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
failure of American International 
Group (AIG), a giant global company 
heavily involved in insuring against 
debt defaults.1
These Fed actions—part of a 
broader U.S. government effort to con-
tain the financial crisis—call to mind 
two earlier financial interventions: in the 
case of Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) in 1998 and in the aftermath of 
the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
In both episodes, the Fed felt 
compelled to protect the financial sys-
tem from severe shocks and the over-
all economy from spillovers that might 
produce serious downturns. Inherent 
in the Fed’s moves was a natural by-
product of intervention—moral hazard 
and the controversy that flows from it.
Concern about moral hazard helps 
explain why the Fed has traditionally 
intervened only rarely and reluctantly, 
trying to do what’s necessary, but as 
little as necessary, to achieve financial 
stability. Markets generally should and 
do self-correct. When potential finan-
cial problems arise, the Fed’s default 
reaction has usually been to do noth-
ing and let the markets work their way 
through the difficulties. 
On rare occasions, however, the 
markets themselves are at risk of fail-
ure. In such cases, the Fed can’t fulfill 
its obligation to promote financial sta-
bility without direct action. Two factors 
have strengthened the case for central 
bank intervention in the past decade—
the financial system’s increased global-
ization and the untested nature of the 
new and complex financial instruments 
that have come under stress. 
The escalation of what’s now rec-
ognized as a global financial crisis has 
changed the modus operandi of Fed 
interventions. The guiding principle of 
do what is necessary, but as little as 
necessary, has been replaced by the 
recognition—reinforced by actions—of 
the importance of doing whatever it 
takes to break the downward spiral in 
the financial and credit markets that 
has contaminated the overall economy. 
With a broad understanding of the 
consequences of inaction, the Fed has 
taken a hard turn toward intervention 
in an atmosphere in which fear of 
moral hazard has been displaced by 
the reality of systemic risk’s unaccept-
able consequences.
Fed intervention helped defuse 
threats to the financial system from 
LTCM’s failure and the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks. The central bank accepted 
the moral hazard from intervention as 
the price for avoiding larger financial 
breakdowns. In the current crisis, the 
Fed’s actions have no doubt mitigated 
damage to the financial system and 
economy. Doing so, however, required 
developing new tactics to address the 
crisis, going far beyond the traditional 
instruments of monetary policy.
Intervention’s By-Product
Moral hazard, a term first used 
by the insurance industry, captures the 
unfortunate paradox of efforts to miti-
gate the adverse consequences of risk: 
They may encourage the very behav-
iors they’re intended to prevent. For 
example, individuals insured against 
automobile theft may be less vigilant 
about locking their cars because losses 
due to carelessness are partly borne by 
the insurance company. 
Moral hazard occurs whenever an 
institution like the Fed cushions the 
adverse impact of events. More to the 
point, lessening the consequences of 
risky financial behavior encourages 
greater carelessness about risk down 
the road as investors come to count on 
benign intervention. Moral hazard must 
be weighed carefully in responding to 
financial crises. 
In the cases of Bear Stearns and 
AIG, some argue that the greater good 
would have been served had the Fed 
stood back and allowed the firms to 
fail, immediately taking all manage-
ment, shareholders and creditors down 
with them. This course would avoid 
moral hazard entirely—and satisfy the 
general public’s desire for seeing Wall 
Street highfliers brought low.
The Fed, however, must be ever 
vigilant in its mission. The Federal 
Reserve Act explicitly and implicitly 
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sets out several mandates to guide Fed 
actions. The most important are
• Full employment and sustain-  
  able economic growth;
• Price stability;
• Banking and financial system  
  stability.
By intervening in a financial crisis, 
the Fed doesn’t allow markets to play 
their natural role of judge, jury and 
executioner. This raises the specter 
of setting a dangerous precedent that 
could prompt private-sector entities to 
take additional risk, assuming the Fed 
will cushion the impact of reckless 
decisionmaking. So when intervention 
is the only option, the Fed has the 
duty to minimize micro moral haz-
ard—that is, the benefit to any specific 
firm or industry.
Minimizing micro moral hazard 
starts with imposing tough terms—gen-
erally the orderly closure of the trou-
bled firms that benefit from interven-
tion. The Fed didn’t just shovel money 
at Bear Stearns’ and AIG’s problems. 
It demanded collateral for the loans 
and charged interest—in AIG’s case, at 
high rates. 
Minimizing micro moral hazard 
means keeping information about the 
targets, timing and terms of any poten-
tial intervention as vague as possible, 
a tactic sometimes called “constructive 
ambiguity.” 
Minimizing micro moral hazard 
also means aiding selected firms only 
as a last resort. Federal authorities 
found alternative solutions short of 
direct intervention for some financial 
giants. The Fed expedited the reclassi-
fication of investment banks Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley to bank 
holding companies. Private-sector buy-
ers acquired Merrill Lynch, Washington 
Mutual and Wachovia. 
When direct intervention does 
take place, the Fed’s duty goes beyond 
minimizing micro moral hazard. The 
central bank has the equally important 
responsibility to maximize macro moral 
hazard—a somewhat counterintuitive 
term that captures the greater good 
of preventing unnecessary damage to 
financial markets and the economy.2 
Maximizing macro moral haz-
ard recognizes the Fed’s obligation 
to reduce the risks of recession and 
price instability and the risks stemming 
from an unstable banking and finan-
cial system. By fostering a more stable 
macroeconomic environment, the Fed’s 
policy actions reduce the private sec-
tor’s pain from bad decisionmaking. 
The outright, uncontrolled col-
lapse of Bear Stearns or AIG could 
have harmed millions of households 
and companies as financial market 
troubles brutalized retirement accounts, 
paralyzed the flow of capital, and 
ultimately led to layoffs, stunted con-
sumption and a severe recession. The 
goal of Fed intervention is to prevent, 
or at least forestall, such macroeco-
nomic spillovers.3 
Hedge Fund on the Edge
Long-Term Capital Management 
provides an apt starting point for a 
discussion of Fed intervention because 
it involved the first financial disruption 
after the rapid expansion of the shadow 
banking system, a shorthand term for 
the financial services segment that 
includes big brokerage firms, hedge 
funds and innovative financial products 
like structured investment vehicles.4 
These entities aren’t subject to the same 
supervision as banks, so they don’t 
hold as much capital to cushion them-
selves against losses.
A high-profile hedge fund founded 
in 1993, LTCM brought together the 
best minds of academia and Wall Street. 
John W. Meriwether, former manager of 
one of Salomon Brothers’ most profit-
able bond divisions, recruited renowned 
Ph.D.’s such as Myron Scholes and 
Robert Merton, soon-to-be winners of 
the 1997 Nobel Prize in economics, 
and former Fed Vice Chairman David 
Mullins. The partners’ aim was to profit 
from market-price anomalies using com-
plex mathematical models.
At its peak, the fund earned 
stunning returns of more than 40 per-
cent. In 1997, as increased competi-
tion began squeezing margins, LTCM 
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reached for high returns by leverag-
ing its capital through risky securities 
repurchase contracts and derivatives 
transactions. By some accounts, the 
fund used capital of $2.3 billion to 
support investments of $125 billion. 
 The first sign that LTCM might 
be in trouble came when the fund 
lost 10 percent on its investments in 
June 1998. The situation worsened in 
mid-August, when a deep decline in 
oil prices left the economies of Russia 
and other oil-exporting countries in a 
precarious state. Russia’s debt default 
and devaluation of the ruble prompted 
a massive flight of investors from risky 
securities to U.S. Treasuries and a dra-
matic widening in interest rate spreads.
Global bond markets plunged, 
and in August alone, LTCM lost $1.8 
billion—44 percent of its capital. 
Losses piled upon losses and reached 
$4.8 billion. As LTCM faced increasing 
margin calls, default was imminent.
The speed with which LTCM spi-
raled out of control recalls an old say-
ing in financial circles: If I owe a bank 
a million dollars and I can’t pay, I’m in 
trouble. If I owe a bank a billion dol-
lars and I can’t pay, the bank’s in trou-
ble. If I owe a dozen banks billions of 
dollars each and I can’t pay, the bank-
ing system could be in trouble.
The threat of systemic risk led 
the Fed to help arrange a managed 
unwinding of LTCM’s affairs, which 
would let the fund fail and avoid a 
fire sale of its assets. On Sept. 23, the 
New York Fed facilitated a meeting 
with top executives from 14 Wall Street 
and international banking firms. With 
the exception of Bear Stearns, which 
declined to participate, the financial 
institutions agreed to back a capital 
infusion of $3.5 billion. The deal trans-
ferred oversight and veto power and a 
90 percent equity stake to the consor-
tium, leaving a 10 percent stake for the 
LTCM partners as an incentive to close 
down operations in an orderly fashion.5
In his Oct. 1, 1998, congres-
sional testimony, Fed Chairman Alan 
Greenspan explained why the Fed 
decided to intervene: “Had the failure 
of LTCM triggered the seizing up of 
markets, substantial damage could 
have been inflicted on many mar-
ket participants, including some not 
directly involved with the firm, and 
could have potentially impaired the 
economies of many nations, including 
our own.” 
The Fed’s action helped contain 
possible spillovers, but it didn’t pre-
serve LTCM. The hedge fund failed, 
but in a way that minimized the 
impact on financial markets and the 
economy—at the cost of both micro 
and macro moral hazard.   
Financial Crisis Averted
On Sept. 11, 2001, terrorists 
hijacked four planes, crashed two into 
New York’s World Trade Center, a 
third into the Pentagon and a fourth 
in a field in Pennsylvania. The nation 
watched in horror as both WTC towers 
collapsed. The financial system wasn’t 
the target per se, but it was thrown 
into disarray. The most direct impact 
was the closure of U.S. financial mar-
kets for four days—only the seventh 
time they’d shut down for such a long 
stretch. A secondary impact came from 
the closure of U.S. airspace, which 
stopped the movement of mail and 
checks around the country.
Exacerbating the situation was 
the backdrop against which the events 
occurred. The U.S. economy was 
in the sixth month of a recession, 
although this wasn’t widely recog-
nized at the time, not even within the 
Fed. And financial markets were skit-
tish, mired in the biggest bear market 
since the Great Depression. By early 
September, the Standard & Poor’s 500 
Index was down 29 percent from its 
March 2000 peak and the Nasdaq had 
lost 67 percent of its value.
Immediately after the attacks, the 
S&P 500 futures declined precipitously, 
and chaos reigned on the streets near 
the New York Fed, the New York 
Stock Exchange and elsewhere in the 
financial district—all within blocks of 
the fallen towers. It became apparent 
that U.S. financial markets couldn’t 
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open. At 10 a.m., 74 minutes after the 
first plane hit the World Trade Center 
and 30 minutes after the stock market’s 
scheduled opening, the Fed released 
a statement: “The Federal Reserve 
System is open and operating. The 
discount window is available to meet 
liquidity needs.”
Though the financial markets 
would remain closed for the rest of the 
week, the Fed did indeed remain open. 
In the days after the terrorists struck:6
• The discount window lent $45.5   
  billion on Sept. 12, compared  
  with the Wednesday average of  
  $59 million the previous two   
  months.
• Check float jumped to $22.9   
  billion that day, well above    
  the two-month average of $720  
  million.
• The New York Fed used open  
  market operations to inject $61  
  billion in liquidity into the econ- 
  omy on Sept. 12, then added   
  another $38 billion on Sept. 19.
• The Fed arranged foreign    
  exchange swap lines with the  
  European Central Bank, the    
  Bank of England and the Bank  
  of Canada to provide dollar    
  liquidity to global markets.
When the markets reopened 
Sept. 17, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) held an emergency 
conference call and cut the fed funds 
rate, which applies to banks’ short-
term borrowing from one another, 
from 3.5 percent to 3 percent. As 
other short-term rates fell in response 
to the Fed’s move, many businesses 
and individuals saw their borrowing 
costs decline. The statement the Fed 
released in announcing its action reit-
erated the central bank’s commitment 
to providing liquidity and keeping the 
fed funds rate below target, as needed.
Although the Dow Jones industri-
als suffered what was, until the cur-
rent crisis, its worst one-day point loss 
on Sept. 17, panic was averted.7 The 
payments system returned to normal 
within days, and the recession ended 
two months later.
In the wake of 9/11, the Fed cast 
a wide and deep safety net to pre-
vent the systemic risk that could have 
resulted from a meltdown of the finan-
cial system spreading to the U.S. and 
other economies around the globe. 
Despite the obvious need for interven-
tion, the Fed’s actions entailed some 
degree of moral hazard.
The Current Crisis
Signs of trouble began surfacing 
in February 2007, when a handful of 
financial companies took losses on 
assets related to U.S. subprime mort-
gages. What would become the worst 
financial crisis since the Depression 
wasn’t widely acknowledged for six 
more months—not by financial mar-
kets, not by policymakers.8 
Since then, banks, brokerages, 
investment houses and hedge funds 
worldwide have revealed a seemingly 
endless succession of losses, write-
downs and outright failures. Behind 
the crisis is the collapse of a five-year 
boom in housing prices that had been 
fueled by risky and exotic mortgage 
financing backed by unprecedented 
levels of leverage. 
Some subprime loans offered 
low initial interest rates; others only 
required interest payments, needed no 
down payment or were made with no 
proof of income. The mortgages were 
bundled into multilayered securities 
graded by risk, then sold to hedge 
funds, investment banks, insurance 
companies and other investors, many 
of which sought to reduce risks associ-
ated with the mortgages by purchasing 
credit default swaps (CDS).
A relatively new entry in the 
financial derivatives market, these 
instruments committed one party to 
cover its counterparty’s losses should 
an investment go sour. In 2000, the 
CDS market was $1 trillion; by 2008, 
it was $62 trillion, roughly 4.5 times 
U.S. gross domestic product. These 
derivatives helped fuel the surge in 
mortgage-backed securities by reduc-
ing perceived default risk. 
When the housing bubble burst, 
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default risk far exceeded what inves-
tors had anticipated, and the market 
for mortgage-backed securities cra-
tered. Financial institutions found 
themselves holding large portfolios of 
hard-to-value assets that could only be 
sold at fire-sale prices. 
As assets deteriorated, we began 
to hear a lot about counterparty risk. 
What if CDS sellers couldn’t fulfill their 
obligation to insure assets against loss-
es? If a major player in the vast, tan-
gled credit derivatives market were to 
collapse, it could start a chain reaction 
in which one counterparty’s default 
undermines the ability of other firms to 
fulfill their obligations. Markets would 
begin doubting the counterparties, and 
investors would flee these companies, 
leaving them to face the grim task of 
attracting new capital in skeptical mar-
kets. If they can’t, they sink into trou-
ble. A significant number of troubled 
firms would trigger systemic risk.
Credit default swaps and other 
financial innovations hadn’t been test-
ed under adverse conditions. What’s 
more, they took off at a time when 
markets and the economy had become 
more globalized and technology-driv-
  This  decision  tree  summarizes  how  the  Fed 
responds to potential financial crises. After getting a 
reading on the economy’s vital signs, the Fed deter-
mines whether the threat at hand might compromise 
the central bank’s three primary goals. 
  If the Fed sees little risk, no action is taken, avoid-
ing moral hazard and leaving the markets to sort out 
the difficulties. The Fed reacts this way to nearly all 
potential troubles in the financial sector. 
  A pervasive threat to the overall economy or the 
financial system can justify direct action. The Fed 
rarely  makes  these  interventions;  when  it  does,  it 
strives to manage the resulting moral hazard in the 
least costly way. 
  The first choice entails the Fed’s acting as an out-
side coordinator to bring together private institutions 
to defuse the threat. It’s a strategy that minimizes 
public-sector risk, and the central bank used it with the 
Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998.
  When this option isn’t feasible, the Federal Reserve 
Act provides the authority to deal directly with press-
ing threats. The preferred strategy involves forging 
partnerships with private institutions, a course the 
Fed took in March 2008 with Bear Stearns, a trou-
bled investment bank and brokerage with sufficient 
remaining collateral to support the intervention. 
  When private partners aren’t willing to step up, the 
Fed can act alone if troubled firms still have sufficient 
collateral.  In  September  2008,  the  Fed  arranged  a 
purely public intervention for AIG, a huge financial 
services company.
  If  remaining  collateral  is  insufficient  to  support 
taxpayer-financed actions, the Fed under current law 
is obliged to let the markets decide a troubled firm’s 
fate. The Fed accepted this outcome with Lehman 
Brothers in 2008. 
Threat to Fed’s goals?
• Full employment/sustainable  
  economic growth
• Price stability




• No moral hazard
• Markets self-correct
Manage moral hazard 
in least costly way
• Rare response
• Contain the problem
• Support the financial system
• Intervention targets ultimately  





• Initial conditions matter
Minimizing Micro Moral Hazard: The Fed Rarely Intervenes
Potential 
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en, factors that both made the financial 
universe more complex and increased 
uncertainty about how to respond to 
potentially widespread failures of these 
new instruments.
The Fed didn’t sit idly by as trem-
ors shook the financial markets. As 
with the 9/11 threat, its initial response 
focused on injecting liquidity into the 
financial system. On Aug. 17, 2007, 
the Federal Reserve Board cut a half 
percentage point off the discount rate, 
making it cheaper for commercial 
banks to borrow short-term funds from 
the Fed. On Sept. 18, the FOMC sur-
prised financial markets by reducing 
the fed funds rate to 4.75 percent. The 
Board also cut the discount rate a half 
point. Over the next year, the FOMC 
cut the fed funds rate eight more 
times, dropping it to 1 percent at the 
end of October.9 The Board gradually 
reduced the discount rate from 5.75 
percent on Sept. 18, 2007, to 1.25 per-
cent on Oct. 29, 2008.
Unlike the Long-Term Capital 
Management and 9/11 episodes, which 
resolved themselves quickly, the latest 
financial turmoil continued to bubble 
throughout 2008, leading the Fed to 
100% private-sector 
solution possible





• Invoke Federal Reserve Act  
  § 13.3
• Minimize public-sector risk
Insufficient collateral 
available




• No moral hazard 
• Market solution 
• Example: Lehman Brothers
Public–private hybrid
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take unorthodox steps to make money 
available to the financial system. The 
central bank opened its lending opera-
tions to different kinds of financial insti-
tutions, granted longer-term loans and 
accepted a broader range of collateral.
In December 2007, the Fed intro-
duced the first of several new lending 
mechanisms—the term auction facility, 
which lends to banks for longer peri-
ods and usually at a lower rate than 
they could secure via the discount 
window. Part of the reasoning behind 
the new facility was to avoid the per-
ception that discount window borrow-
ing is a sign of financial weakness.
A stickier issue was capital con-
straints at primary dealers, a class of 
lenders not regulated by the Fed and 
without access to its credit facilities. 
(See box titled “Primary Dealers’ Critical 
Role.”) The term securities lending 
facility, established in March 2008, pro-
vides extra liquidity through a 28-day 
program that allows, for a fee, primary 
dealers to acquire Treasury-grade assets 
by using riskier assets as collateral. 
The primary dealer credit facil-
ity, also created in March, extends the 
Fed’s safety net by opening discount 
window loans to primary dealers. 
As the financial crisis deepened, the 
Fed created lending programs to add 
liquidity to other segments of the 
financial markets. In September, for 
example, the central bank made mon-
ey available to foreign central banks, 
commercial paper investors and money 
market funds. 
No lending facility could effec-
tively address the kind of crisis of 
confidence that befell Bear Stearns, an 
investment bank and brokerage that 
had been a Wall Street fixture since 
1923, surviving even the stock mar-
ket crash of 1929 without laying off 
employees. 
On Monday, March 10, 2008, 
rumors hit European trading floors 
that Bear Stearns might be unable to 
fulfill commitments for its trades. The 
company’s management was quick to 
address the reports but couldn’t quash 
the mounting speculation. The rumors 
became self-reinforcing, compelling 
some trading partners to pull back 
from doing business with Bear Stearns. 
A de facto run had begun. 
On Thursday, Bear Stearns’ CEO 
reached out to the New York Fed 
and the Treasury Department, setting 
into motion a whirlwind that would 
bring an end to an institution that had 
accumulated $1.6 billion in losses and 
write-downs. Two days later, a firm 
that had a peak market value of $25 
billion in January 2007 was offered to 
J.P. Morgan Chase for $236 million, a 
mere 3 cents on the dollar. 
When Bear Stearns sought help, 
the New York Fed could have done 
what the Fed usually does when a ship 
is at risk of sinking on its watch: noth-
ing. Bear Stearns would have been 
allowed to fail, and the Fed would have 
stood witness to a company reaping 
what its missteps had sown. The tale 
would have been tragic in the same 
vein as the fates suffered by Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, the Wall Street 
brokerage that fell victim to the junk 
bond bust of the 1980s, and Enron, the 
energy giant that toppled in 2001.
The Fed did nothing for Drexel or 
Enron. However, it supported the J.P. 
Morgan deal with an unprecedented 
$29 billion loan to an entity created to 
purchase largely mortgage-related Bear 
Stearns assets. The agreement calls for 
the loan, made at the discount rate 
for up to 10 years, to be repaid as the 
assets are sold. If they appreciate by 
more than operating expenses, the Fed 
stands to make a profit. It will bear any 
losses beyond the $1.15 billion contrib-
uted to the entity by J.P. Morgan. 
The Fed decided to facilitate the 
Bear Stearns sale because it feared dire 
consequences for the financial system. 
Bear Stearns had open trades with no 
fewer than 5,000 other firms. On a 
much grander scale, the firm was one 
of the world’s largest counterparties, 
reporting in a Nov. 30, 2007, Securities 
and Exchange Commission filing that 
its derivative holdings had total lever-
age of $13.4 billion. The company 
was involved in 750,000 contracts in 
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March 2008, according to the New 
York Fed. Allowing the company to 
default would have triggered the first 
stress test of the fast-growing, interwo-
ven derivatives market, an event that 
would undermine the Fed’s ability to 
meet its legal mandates for growth, 
price stability and financial stability. 
The Fed actions were aimed at 
reducing risks to the financial system, 
not helping Bear Stearns’ owners. 
The company’s stock price peaked 
above $171 a share in January 2007, 
representing a market capitalization of 
some $25 billion. Despite the financial 
turmoil of early 2008, it was at $70 a 
share just before the ill-fated week of 
March 10–17. It’s difficult to fathom 
how much more the Fed could have 
adhered to its commitment to minimize 
micro moral hazard, considering the 
$2 a share price reached during the 
negotiations. To keep Bear Stearns 
out of bankruptcy court, J.P. Morgan 
Chase eventually raised its offer to 
$10 a share, or $1.4 billion, still a faint 
shadow of where the market had val-
ued Bear a year earlier. 
The authority to intervene in 
Bear Stearns can be found in a 1932 
amendment to the Federal Reserve 
Act, allowing the central bank to make 
direct loans outside the banking sys-
tem “in unusual and exigent circum-
stances.” The power was last used in 
the Great Depression.10 
The Fed used this authority again 
when AIG appeared on the brink. The 
company’s sound businesses were 
being threatened by the excessive CDS 
risks taken by its London-based AIG 
Financial Products unit. After a year in 
which AIG took $18 billion in losses, 
the company faced a cash crunch after 
mid-September downgrades to its cred-
it rating. It needed a $13 billion capital 
infusion in a week in which investors 
showed their lack of confidence in the 
company by driving down its stock 
price 80 percent.
When AIG couldn’t raise money 
in the private sector, it turned to the 
Fed and the Treasury. The central 
bank provided a two-year, $85 billion 
line of credit, secured by warrants, 
to purchase nearly 80 percent of the 
company if AIG fails to raise enough 
money through asset sales or other 
means to repay the loan. The Sept. 16 
agreement’s interest rate was steep—
indeed, punitive—at 8.5 percent above 
the London interbank offered rate 
(Libor), an industry benchmark.11 
Primary Dealers’ Critical Role
Primary dealers are banks and securities broker-dealers that trade in U.S. government 
securities with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. They’re vital to monetary policy because 
the  New  York  Fed’s  Open  Market  Desk  trades  on  behalf  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System. 
Purchasing government securities in the secondary market adds reserves to the banking 
system; selling securities drains them.
The New York Fed established the system in 1960 with 18 primary dealers. The number 
peaked at 46 in 1988 before starting to decline in the mid-1990s. By 2007, it was down to 20. 
The main reason for the dwindling number of dealers has been consolidation, as firms have 
merged or refocused their core lines of business. (A list of primary dealers can be found on the 
New York Fed’s website at www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed02.html.) 
In addition to their role in monetary policy, primary dealers are important in keeping the 
nation’s fiscal house in order. The federal government tends to spend more each year than 
it takes in from tax revenue. To keep Washington open and operating, and the government 
functioning around the world, the Treasury raises money by selling bills, notes and bonds to 
investors. In recent years, more than half the money raised has come from foreigners.
Primary dealers handle the bulk of the underwriting—that is, the buying, handling and 
distribution of the U.S. debt. In addition to distributing new Treasury securities, the dealer 
network makes a deep, broad and liquid secondary market for previously issued Treasury 
securities. 
A liquid secondary market enhances the marketability of Treasury debt and lessens the 
burden of financing government operations for taxpayers. Without this network of dealers, the 
Treasury would be hard-pressed to reliably finance essential government services.
An efficient primary dealer network is important for other reasons. Nearly all debt is 
priced off of interest rates on similar maturity Treasury securities. The Treasury rate is the 
so-called risk-free rate in the economy. Private-sector borrowers pay the risk-free rate, plus a 
premium to compensate for potential default risk. 
The U.S. and global financial systems, not to mention the U.S. economy and its millions 
of businesses and households, are absolutely dependent upon a smoothly functioning and 
reliable Treasury market for financing their credit needs. If the Treasury market is closed or not 
working properly because of problems with the primary dealer network, credit can’t be priced 
and can’t flow, leaving the private sector starved for credit.
With the primary dealers’ pivotal role in mind, on March 16 the Federal Reserve Board 
invoked the emergency provisions of the Federal Reserve Act, authorizing the New York Fed 
to extend the discount window’s safety net to primary dealers. In its announcement, the Fed 
said it created the primary dealer credit facility to “bolster market liquidity and promote orderly 
market functioning.” The action left no doubt about primary dealers’ important role: “Liquid, 
well-functioning markets are essential for the promotion of economic growth.”   EconomicLetter  Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 10   Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
Like Bear Stearns, AIG had invest-
ed heavily in CDS markets. At the 
end of September 2007, its Financial 
Products unit had $505 billion in expo-
sure, stretching into many parts of the 
world. A year later, AIG had written 
down a fifth of its exposure but still 
stood on the precipice. In announcing 
its decision on Sept. 16, the Fed said 
it saw enough risk to conclude that “a 
disorderly failure of AIG could add to 
already significant levels of financial 
market fragility and lead to substan-
tially higher borrowing costs, reduced 
household wealth and materially weak-
er economic performance.”
Many critics contend that Bear 
Stearns and AIG were “bailed out.” 
Former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill 
refuted this notion in a New York 
Times exchange on Bear Stearns:12
Times: Do you think it was 
appropriate for the Federal Reserve to 
lend a helping hand to Bear Stearns 
and save a private investment com-
pany from its own bad decisions?
O’Neill: I would say they didn’t 
save Bear Stearns. They saved the 
financial system from a panic collapse. 
I reject the notion they helped Bear 
Stearns. Bear Stearns was destroyed. 
[Emphasis added]
Times: No it wasn’t. It was pur-
chased by J.P. Morgan, which will 
keep it alive.
O’Neill: They’re going to keep 
the book alive. But the institution 
of Bear Stearns has been destroyed. 
They’ve gone from $158 to $2 of equi-
ty. It’s wallpaper. It’s not even good 
wallpaper. It’s butcher paper.
The Lehman Decision
Roughly six months after the Bear 
Stearns intervention and amid AIG’s 
unraveling, another Wall Street invest-
ment bank and primary dealer found 
itself on the brink. Round-the-clock 
efforts by the Fed and Treasury to find 
a buyer for Lehman Brothers Holdings 
over the weekend of Sept. 13–14 fell 
apart. On Monday, Lehman became the 
largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, list-
ing liabilities of $613 billion in its filing. 
The impact—both predictable and 
unpredictable—of Lehman’s failure 
reverberated immediately through glob-
al financial markets. The fallout spread 
to individuals and businesses with 
seemingly no connection to Lehman.
In the LTCM and Bear Stearns 
interventions, the Fed contended its 
actions were necessary to keep finan-
cial markets from seizing up and to 
minimize the negative spillovers on the 
broad economy. The Fed feared that 
the quick and disorderly failures of 
some financial enterprises would have 
systemic effects on the nation and 
likely, around the globe. 
In April 3, 2008, testimony to 
Congress about the Fed’s intervention in 
Bear Stearns, New York Fed President 
Timothy Geithner described the adverse 
consequence the Fed sought to avoid: 
“Asset price declines … led to a reduc-
tion in the willingness to bear risk 
and to margin calls … [resulting in] a 
self-reinforcing downward spiral of … 
forced sales, lower prices, higher vola-
tility and still lower prices.” 
Geithner cataloged the possible 
spillover effects from Bear Stearns’ col-
lapse—protracted damage to the finan-
cial system, widespread insolvencies 
and ultimately higher unemployment 
and borrowing costs, and a lower 
standard of living because of losses to 
retirement savings. 
Why didn’t similar arguments per-
suade the Fed to prevent the collapse 
of Lehman, an investment bank and 
primary dealer comparable to Bear 
Stearns in size and importance? The 
answer, according to Fed Chairman 
Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson, came down to unten-
able taxpayer losses and doubts about 
the legal authority to intervene in this 
particular case.
A few weeks after Lehman’s bank-
ruptcy, Bernanke addressed the issue: 
“Facilitating the sale of Lehman … 
would have required a very sizeable 
injection of public funds … and would 
have involved the assumption by tax-
payers of billions of dollars of expect-
ed losses…. Neither the Treasury nor 
Interestingly, some critics 
who chastised the Fed for 
creating moral hazard with 
Bear Stearns declared that 
moral hazard should have 
been disregarded in the case 
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the Federal Reserve had the authority 
to commit public money in that way; 
in particular, the Federal Reserve’s 
loans must be sufficiently secured to 
provide reasonable assurance that the 
loan will be fully repaid. Such collat-
eral was not available in this case.”13 
Lehman had months to find 
private buyers for all or parts of its 
enterprise. None could be found, not 
even with the help of the Fed and the 
Treasury. And the firm’s condition had 
deteriorated to the point where the 
Fed couldn’t find sufficient collateral 
for a primary dealer credit facility loan. 
Within hours of Lehman’s bank-
ruptcy filing, the negative consequenc-
es contemplated by Geithner in Bear 
Stearns’ case began to unfold. Losses 
tied to holdings of Lehman debt forced 
one of the oldest money market funds 
to sink below the purchase price of 
$1 a share, financial markets seized 
up, stock markets around the world 
plunged, and governments were even-
tually forced to inject capital directly 
into their banking systems and extend 
deposit insurance safety nets.
In some ways, the Lehman epi-
sode was as close as possible to a 
controlled experiment in the realm of 
economics. By not intervening, the Fed 
created no moral hazard. Interestingly, 
some critics who chastised the Fed 
for creating moral hazard with Bear 
Stearns declared that moral hazard 
should have been disregarded in the 
case of Lehman. 
Little will be gained by debating 
the what-ifs surrounding Lehman. By 
the time Lehman filed for bankruptcy, 
the cost to insure the debt of other 
investment banks had also skyrocketed. 
A prohibitively expensive Lehman res-
cue would have merely forestalled one 
failure, but many other at-risk invest-
ment banks would have remained as 
the financial system buckled under 
intense leverage. What Lehman 
revealed was the need to give authori-
ties better tools to manage the threats 
to firms considered key to the nation’s 
and the world’s financial infrastructure.14
What are the lessons of Lehman’s 
demise? In particular, should moral 
hazard be categorically and systemati-
cally avoided? With the interconnect-
edness of the global economic and 
financial systems, it’s clear that fire 
sales can spread to distant places and 
impact economic entities far removed 
from the initial calamity. It took the 
collateral damage from Lehman’s bank-
ruptcy for this to be widely appreci-
ated by those who have invoked moral 
hazard to argue against Fed interven-
tions. Moral hazard has its costs, but it 
also has its benefits.
The Fed’s Hippocratic Oath
A basic precept taught in medi-
cal schools is first, do no harm. All 
interventions—whether they involve 
medicine or finance—have potential 
costs, benefits and unintended conse-
quences. These are often difficult to 
anticipate, especially in the financial 
realm, where crises occur infrequently 
and each differs from its predecessors 
in important ways. 
In keeping with the principle of 
doing no harm, it is ideal to leave 
markets to work their magic. When 
the Fed does intervene, it tries to do 
what’s necessary—but as little as nec-
essary—to achieve financial stability.
This is as it should be. 
Unfortunately, defining “as little as 
necessary” is rarely easy. In turbulent 
times, the challenge regulators face is 
that maps charted during past crises are 
all but irrelevant. Each crisis requires 
judgment calls that must be executed 
in real time, often using incomplete 
and partly accurate information.
In the current financial crisis’ first 
year, the Fed’s response has been 
measured, reflecting the commitment 
to doing only what’s necessary. The 
central bank began with the hope that 
the routine tools of monetary policy 
would be sufficient to lessen the 
danger to the markets and the econ-
omy. The Fed turned to unorthodox 
solutions—the new lending facilities 
and direct intervention—only when 
faced with a deepening crisis. Direct 
intervention has been rare, taken only 
Like it or not, central 
bankers face the reality that 
managing moral hazard 
is an inescapable part of 
their job description. Seeking 
to minimize micro moral 
hazard during tumultuous 
times is as far as they 
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when stakes were high and other 
options were exhausted.
Intervention in the financial mar-
kets in general, or in the affairs of a 
single financial institution, remains a 
red-button option, reserved solely for 
tangible threats to the Fed’s primary 
goals. The Fed prefers to rely on the 
self-correcting mechanisms of market 
forces. This discipline flows from a 
guiding principle: No one entity is too 
big to fail; only the financial system is 
too big to fail. Some entities may be 
so caught in the intricate weave of the 
financial system that their problems 
can’t be resolved quickly. Using this 
metaphor, Bear Stearns and AIG were 
single threads that, if pulled, could have 
unraveled the entire financial system. 
As ideal as it would be to 
eliminate moral hazard, the Fed—the 
central bank for the world’s largest 
economy—can’t do that and fulfill its 
legal mandates. Like it or not, central 
bankers face the reality that managing 
moral hazard is an inescapable part of 
their job description. Seeking to mini-
mize micro moral hazard during tumul-
tuous times is as far as they can go. 
Rosenblum is executive vice president and direc-
tor of research, DiMartino is a financial analyst, 
Renier is a research analyst and Alm is senior 
economics writer in the Research Department at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
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